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WANTED: A STRICT CONTRACTUAL APPROACH
TO THE PRIVATE UNIVERSITY/STUDENT
RELATIONSHIP
INTRODUCTION
Institutions of higher education command and receive con-
siderable respect in our society.1 An apparent corollary of this
revered status is the deference accorded colleges and universi-
ties by the courts. This deferential attitude is brought into
sharp focus when a contractual dispute arises between a pri-
vate university2 and one of its students.
It is well settled that the private university/student rela-
tionship is contractual in nature.3 Educational contracts, how-
ever, are regarded as possessing unique features that require
special consideration;4 a construction which preserves schools'
I See Parsons & Platt, Considerations on the American Academic System, in
READER ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE ACADEMIC PROFESSION (W. Mitzger ed. 1977).
See also Medalia, On Becoming a College Teacher: A Review of Three Variables,
in READER ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE ACADEMIC PROFESSION (W. Mitzger ed. 1977).
Medalia describes what he terms the "truly exalted standing" of the college professor
in American society. His conclusions are based on several public opinion polls that
place college instructors at the high end of respected occupations.
2 Although some of the issues discussed in this comment are equally applicable
to public universities, this comment primarily will concentrate on private univer-
sity/student contract disputes.
I Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060 (N.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd mem., 579 F.2d
45 (5th Cir. 1978); Auser v. Cornell Univ., 337 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1972); Carr v. St. John's
Univ., 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, aff'd mem., 187 N.E.2d 18 (1962); 15A AM. JuR.2D. Colleges
& Universities § 31 (1976); WILISTON ON CONTRACTS § 90D (3d ed. 1957). See Develop-
ments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HAv. L. REv. 1045, 1145 (1968); Note,
Legal Relationship Between the Student and the Private College or University, 7 SAN
DIEGo L. REV. 244 (1970); Note, Judicial Review of the University-Student Relation-
ship: Expulsion and Governance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 95 (1973-74); Comment, Contract
Law and the Student-University Relationship, 48 INn. L.J. 253 (1972-73); Comment,
Consumer Protection and Higher Education-Student Suits Against Schools, 37 Omo
ST. L.J. 608 (1976).
Although several years ago courts and legal scholars were expressing doubts about
the applicability of contract law in the context of the student/university relationship,
recent cases have adopted the contract approach virtually without question. See notes
40-47 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the criticisms of applying con-
tract law to these disputes.
I Lyons v. Salve Regina College, 565 F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 971 (1978); Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622, 626 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898 (1975); Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060, 1062
(N.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd mem., 579 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1978).
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broad discretionary powers is often viewed as essential.. Thus,
courts have refused to invoke a strict contractual approach in
their consideration of these contracts. The result is that the
contract theory, as it is currently employed, excessively sup-
ports the university's interests while those of the student re-
ceive little protection.'
The recent decision by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in
Lexington Theological Seminary v. Vance7 is illustrative. In
Vance, ." the court rejected a student's argument that catalog
provisions' used to deny the student his degree were too vague
to be enforceable. While this ruling is consistent with the over-
whelming majority of decisions upholding university regula-
tions challenged on the basis of vagueness,9 a strict application
of contract law presumably would have resulted in a decision
favoring the student.10
This Comment proposes that the Vance decision demon-
strates the need for a strict contractual approach to the private
university/student relationship. Without such an application,
student interests will continue to be shortchanged. Because
contract law provides a suitable framework for resolving these
disputes, it should be stringently applied. The result would be
I See Case Note, Contracts-Paynter v. New York University: How Discretionary
are the Inherent Powers of Universities?, 21 DE PAuL L. Rxv. 861, 874 (1971-72).
The goal of a university is to maintain a climate adequately suitable for
the advancement of learning. A natural concomitant, therefore, is that the
university can promulgate its own rules to uphold this academic atmosphere,
and take any necessary steps to punish or forestall conduct implicitly dele-
terious to the university system. Thus, a further rationale for the inherent
discriminatory powers of the university is sustained by the basic needs of
higher learning institutions themselves.
Id.
6 For a similar view, see Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv.
L. REv. 1045, 1145-47 (1968).
1 Nos. 78-CA-1169-MR & 78-CA-1172-MR (Ky. Ct. App. May 18, 1979), dis-
cretionary rev. granted, 589 S.W.2d 897 (Ky., Nov. 13, 1979).
7.1 As this issue went to press, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that discretion-
ary review in the Vance case had been improvidently granted, remanding the case to
the court of appeals. For a discussion of this recent decision, see the Louisville Courier-
Journal, Apr. 2, 1980, at B 8, col. 1.
I Catalogs and other publications of a university are deemed to contain the terms
of the contract. See note 13 infra for relevant authority.
I Depperman v. Univ. of Ky., 371 F. Supp. 73 (E.D. Ky. 1974); Esteban v. Central
Mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1968), affl'd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo.
1968); Carr v. St. John's Univ., 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, aff'd mem., 187 N.E.2d 18 (1962).
See Note, Bringing the Vagueness Doctrine on Campus, 80 YALE L.J. 1261 (1970-71).
10 For a discussion of the Vance case, see notes 71-82 infra and accompanying text.
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a more equitable protection for student and university interests
alike.
I. DEVELOPMENT AND STATUS OF THE UNIVERSITY/
STUDENT CoNTACTuAL RELATIONSHIP
Today the relationship between a student and private uni-
versity is based on an implied contract." If the student com-
plies with graduation requirements, a degree will be con-
ferred.' 2 The terms and conditions of the contract are those
found in catalogs, bulletins and other publications of the col-
lege.'
3
The vast majority of disputes arising from these contracts
involve disciplinary actions. 4 While authority to discipline now
is regarded as the university's express or implied contractual
right,'5 this view has not always been the case. In eighteenth-
" See note 3 supra for a list of relevant source material.
2 However, this contract is subject to conditions. In Andersen v. Regents of Univ.
of Cal., 99 Cal. Rptr. 531, 535, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972), the court said the
idea that the student will conduct himself according to a university's reasonable rules
and regulations is an implied graduation requirement.
,2 Univ. of Miami v. Militana, 184 So.2d 701, 704 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966), affl'd, 236
So.2d 162 (Fla. 1970); 15A AM. JUR. 2d Colleges and Universities § 31, n.67 (1976). But
see Healey v. Larsson, 323 N.Y.S.2d 625, aff'd, 348 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1973), order affl'd,
360 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1974) (In this case the university was ordered to grant a degree to a
student who purportedly had not taken the proper courses. Because university officials
had directed the student to take certain courses to ensure a degree, they were not
allowed to assert later that the student lacked the required credits for graduation).
" It should be noted from the outset that when disciplinary or academic consider-
ations are not involved student contractual rights receive more protection from the
courts. See Peretti v. Mont., 464 F. Supp. 784 (D. Mont. 1979) (where the school's
discontinuance of an aviation program midway during the student's course work was
seen as a breach of an implied contract to allow the student an opportunity to complete
the program and receive a degree); Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 371 N.E.2d
634 (Ill. 1977) (where a prospective student who paid a fifteen dollar application fee
was held entitled by contractual right to an evaluation according to criteria the school
had established and published in its admissions brochure); Stad v. Grace Downs
Model & Air Career School, 319 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1971) (where the puffery statements
included in the school's publications were held to create an implied contract of guaran-
teed job placement which the court determined the school had breached); Behrend v.
State, 379 N.E.2d 617 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) (where the school was held to a contractual
obligation to make every attempt to gain accreditation).
'1 Krasnow v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 414 F. Supp. 55, 56 (W.D. Va.
1976), aff'd, 551 F.2d 591 (4th Cir. 1977); Andersen v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 99 Cal.
Rptr. 531, 535 cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972); Pride v. Howard Univ., [1973-78
Transfer Binder] CoLL. & UNIv. REP. (CCH) 18,638, p. 16,151; Robinson v. Univ. of
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century England, a school's disciplinary powers were based on
its status as a self-governing entity,'" while the concept of in
loco parentis was the early justification for regulation of stu-
dent conduct in the United States.'7 Later, written enrollment
contracts often spelled out the university's right to formulate
and enforce disciplinary rules." In modem times, the publica-
tions of the college, with their general terms concerning student
conduct, give schools the right to dismiss students for rule in-
fractions. 9 When these dismissals occur and the matter is liti-
gated, courts give great deference to the university's decision
that the particular "misconduct" of the student has breached
the contract. 0
While there is nothing wrong with the traditional discre-
tion courts have accorded colleges and universities in
establishing conduct and graduation requirements, determin-
ing when a breach of those requirements has taken place is all
too often left to the university's sole judgment. When schools
are exercising this discretion, courts seldom interfere with that
exercise.2' This restraint is perhaps wise, and certainly more
Miami, 100 So.2d 442, 444 (Fla. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 104 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1958); Carr
v. St. John's Univ., 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, 413, aff'd mem., 187 N.E.2d 18 (1962).
,1 See The King v. Chancellor of the Univ. of Cambridge, 6 T.R. 89, 106, 101 Eng.
Rep. 451, 460 (K.B. 1794).
17 Gott v. Berea College, 161 S.W. 204, 206 (Ky. 1913). Gott held that a university
could impose any disciplinary regulation for a student that a parent might make to
control his child. In Gott, students were forbidden from entering any restaurant not
operated by the college. The court viewed such a regulation as a proper exercise of the
school's discretionary power to guard the student's welfare.
"1 Comment, Contract Law and the Student-University Relationship, 48 IND. L.J.
253, 253 (1972-73).
"1 In fact courts have upheld catalog provisions that enable the school to dismiss
a student at any time. See Robinson v. Univ. of Miami, 100 So.2d 442 (Fla. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 104 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1958).
1 According to the court in Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass.
1957), "The problem of what constitutes an appropriate reason must clearly be left to
those authorites charged with the duty of maintaining the standards and discipline of
the school." Id. at 627. Likewise, in Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr.
463 (Ct. App. 1967), it was stated: "[I]n an academic community, greater freedom
and greater restrictions may prevail than in society at large, and the subtle fixing of
these limits should, in a large measure, be left to the educational institution itself."
Id. at 472. Accord, Bright v. Nunn, 448 F.2d 245, 249 (6th Cir. 1971); Tedeschio v.
Wagner College, 402 N.Y.S.2d 967, 970 (1978), affl'd, No. 778 E (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June
18, 1979), [1979] CoLL. & UNiv. REP. (CCH) T 19,213, p. 16,466.
21 See note 20 supra for citation to cases illustrating this deference.
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frequent, when an academic matter, such as grading, is in-
volved. Courts feel uncomfortable, as well they might, in in-
truding into the academic arena.22 When a student is expelled
or denied his degree for misconduct, however, greater judicial
probing should and sometimes does occur.Y In disciplinary pro-
ceedings, a university is exercising quasi-judicial powers, and
a higher standard of judicial review is thus warranted.
24
When a private university is involved, contract law is the
basis for resolving the dispute.2 When the student pays his fees
and matriculates at the college there is an implied agreement
that he will comply with the school's rules and regulations.
26 It
is unquestionable that private universities have the power to
set forth conduct standards, and those standards can permissi-
bly require above-average morals and behavior.Y In fact, when
a student enters a private religious university, he should be
2 See Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060 (N.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd mem., 579
F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1978). The Jansen court alluded to the "traditional rule of noninter-
vention in academic matters" and declined to review grading methods or degree re-
quirements. Id. at 1063. See Walker v. George Washington Univ., [1979] COLL. &
UNIV. REP. (CCH) 17,838 p. 15,644, No. 4724-77 (D.C. Aug 4, 1977). In Walker, the
court said that scrutiny of academic records involves "subjective judgments that
schools are best able to make and with which the court will not interfere." Id.
23 "[T]he traditional rule of nonintervention in academic matters does not apply
to review of disciplinary actions by educational institutions." Jansen v. Emory Univ.,
440 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd mer., 579 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1978).
24 "The tendency has been to treat the academic administrator's judgment in the
same fashion as the business judgments of a corporate director. The deference has been
extended, however, from the academic realm to the realm of conduct, in which the
expertise of the court is unsurpassed." Case Note, Contracts-Paynter v. New York
University: How Discretionary Are the Inherent Powers of Universities?, 21 DE PAUL
L. REv. 861, 875 (1971-72).
1 See notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this point and
citations to relevant authorities.
26 Anderson v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 99 Cal. Rptr. 531, 535, cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1006 (1972).
1 Krasnow v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 414 F. Supp. 55, 56 (W.D. Va.
1976), aff'd, 551 F.2d 591 (4th Cir. 1977). According to Krasnow, conduct rules formu-
lated by a school may permissibly apply to student actions off campus. See Auser v.
Cornell Univ., 337 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1972), in which the court said:
There is nothing inherently illegal in the setting by a private, or even a
public, institution of higher learning of conditions upon which it will accept
a candidate for a degree. Even if the stipulation made as a condition is
regarded as unreasonable or oppressive, the contract made by the parties
must govern in the absence of fraud or mistake.
Id. at 883.
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aware that high standards of conduct will be imposed and that
dismissal will be the likely result of their breach.2 What is
important, however, is that those standards be defined in un-
ambiguous terms. Unfortunately, such explicitness is seldom
the rule.
2
II. PUBUC V. PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES
The importance of applying strict contract law to private
university/student agreements becomes more apparent when
the rights of a private college student are contrasted with those
of his counterpart at a public institution. For the private uni-
versity student, contract law is the only avenue available for
safeguarding the student's interests.30 Thus a rigid application
of contractual theory is necessary to fully implement those
rights.
Since the Fifth Circuit decided Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education,31 public university students have been af-
forded the protections of procedural due process.3 2 Therefore,
a public university seeking to dismiss a student is subject to
constitutional restraints; 33 these restraints provide the student
2s Comment, supra note 18, at 265.
21 For an illustration of this problem, see notes 58-60 infra and accompanying text.
" Occasionally, courts will hold that mandamus lies to compel a university to
grant a degree. Ordinarily, however, courts will consider a denial of a diploma a breach
of contract for which the student's remedy is a suit for breach or an action for specific
performance. 52 Am. Jun. 2d Mandamus § 250 (1970).
31 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
32 The Dixon court held that a public university is an agent of the state so that
its actions are state actions. Thus the university is bound by due process requirements
in its dealings with students. Id.
" In Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978), the
Supreme Court outlined what procedures must be afforded a student dismissed from
a public educational institution. While notice and a hearing were found necessary for
disciplinary suspensions, the Court said the fourteenth amendment does not require a
hearing for an academic dismissal. As long as the decision to dismiss for academic
reasons is "careful and deliberate," due process is satisfied. See also General Order on
Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Discipline in
Tax-Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133 (1968). These stan-
dards were promulgated by the United States District Court for the Western District
of Missouri:
A federal court should not intervene or reverse or enjoin disciplinary
actions relevant to a lawful mission of an educational institution unless there
appears one of the following:
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significant protection from discriminatory and unwarranted
expulsions.31
These due process protections, however, are not applicable
to private universities. 5 Arguments based on state financial
support" or state certification and supervision have generally
failed to shift the courts from their position that private uni-
versities are exempt from the fourteenth amendment." Such
exemption does not mean that private schools may arbitrarily
(1) a deprival of due process, that is, of fundamental concepts of
fair play;
(2) invidious discrimination, for example, on account of race or
religion;
(3) denial of federal rights, constitutional or statutory, protected
in the academic community; or
(4) clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious action.
Id. at 143.
31 Such protection is by no means complete. With one exception, Soglin v. Kauff-
man, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969), courts have refused to hold disciplinary standards
void for vagueness. Public, as well as private, universities are given considerable lati-
tude in determining if the student's misconduct has breached the applicable regula-
tion. See Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1968),
affl'd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Buttny v. Smiley,
281 F. Supp. 280, 284 (D. Colo. 1968).
In Esteban, the court clearly said the "void for vagueness" doctrine does not apply
to student conduct standards. But in Soglin, the one reported case to apply the vague-
ness doctrine to student conduct regulations, the court held that university regulations
must be expressed in clear and narrow rules. In discussing this issue, the court stated:
Power alone does not supply the standards needed to determine its applica-
tion to types of behavior or specific instances of "misconduct."...
The use of "misconduct" as a standard for imposing the penalties threatened
here must therefore fall for vagueness. The inadequacy of the rule is apparent
on its face. It contains no clue which could assist a student, an administrator
or a reviewing judge in determining whether conduct not transgressing stat-
utes is susceptible to punishment by the University as "misconduct."
418 F.2d 163, 167-68 (7th Cir. 1969).
For an excellent discussion of the vagueness problem with respect to public uni-
versities, see Note, Bringing the Vagueness Doctrine on Campus, 80 YALE L.J. 1261
(1970-71).
Note, supra note 34, at 1270 n.47.
' Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967), issue moot on appeal,
412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
11 But see Ryan v. Hofstra Univ., 324 N.Y.S.2d 964,982 (1971), supplemented, 328
N.Y.S.2d 339 (1972). In Ryan, the court said state financial contributions, regulations
by the New York Dormitory Authority and operation of the university under a fran-
chise from the State Board of Regents constituted sufficient state action to justify
requiring notice and a hearing before the private university could expel a student. Id.
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expel their students at any time for any reason." Rather, the
common law requirements to which private universities are
subject closely approximate those imposed on public colleges
by the due process clause. 9 However, in order for these com-
mon law restraints to be effective, particularly in the area of
contract law, they must be stringently applied.
Ill. PROBLEMS WITH THE CONTRACTUAL APPROACH
One must be aware that strict application of the law of
contracts will not solve all disputes between private universi-
ties and their students. In fact, there are significant problems
with even using contract law in this context. Courts and com-
mentators alike have sharply criticized the application of con-
tract law to the university/student relationship for reasons that
are certainly valid."
One of the major problems arises from construing the uni-
versity catalog as supplying the terms of the contract.4' It has
been noted that most students do not view a catalog as contain-
ing contractual rights.2 Rather, catalogs are perused for aca-
demic and tuition information, and it is rarely realized that the
included disciplinary regulations are binding contract terms.
3
Additionally, some courts have concluded that the unique na-
ture of the student/university relationship prevents strict ap-
plication of formal contract law.44 These courts refuse to view
colleges as business entities subject to commercial contractual
doctrines.
I Tedeschi v. Wagner College, 402 N.Y.S.2d 967, 970 (1978), affl'd, 417 N.Y.S.2d
521 (App. Div. 1979).
s' Abbariao v. Hamline Univ. School of Law, 258 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Minn. 1977).
40 See Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 898 (1975); Note, Legal Relationship Between the Student and the Private
College or University, 7 SAN DEGo L. REv. 244 (1970); Note, Judicial Review of the
University-Student Relationship: Expulsion and Governance, 26 STAN. L. REv. 95
(1973-74); Note, Common Law Rights for Private University Students: Beyond the
State Action Principle, 84 YALE L.J. 120 (1974-75).
"1 In fact, in Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 898 (1975), the court refused even to find that any contract, as
evidenced by the graduate school catalog, was ever formed.
42 Comment, note 18 supra, at 264.
43 Id.
14 Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060, 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd mem.,
579 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1978).
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Another problem arises with using a contractual approach
when the student is a minor. In such cases, the contract be-
tween the student and the university would not be enforceable
against the student, while the university would be considered
an adult party and therefore bound by the contract terms.,5
Furthermore, when a public university is involved" the ele-
ment of freely entering into a bargain would be absent, inas-
much as state-supported schools are generally required to ac-
cept any student who applies.
7
These difficulties with the contractual approach have led
various commentators to suggest alternative methods for han-
dling student/school disputes. Using private associations law,"
treating wrongful expulsion as a tort 9 and viewing the stu-
dent/university relationship in a fiduciary context" have all
been suggested as superior ways of resolving conflicts. Courts,
however, have not accepted these suggestions, and contract law
remains the primary instrument at their disposal.51 That in-
strument could be applied more effectively if courts would use
a strict contract theory as opposed to the watered-down ap-
proach presently employed.
IV. USING A STRICT CONTRACTUAL APPROACH
Most breach of contract actions in the student/university
area center on dismissal of a student for alleged misconduct.
Courts rarely overturn a university's decision and order rein-
" Ryan v. Hofstra Univ., 324 N.Y.S.2d 964, 973-74 (1971), supplemented, 328
N.Y.S.2d 339 (1972).
11 Contract law is used to resolve public university/student disputes not involving
constitutional questions. Comment, note 18 supra, at 255.
K. ALEXANDER & E. SOLOMON, COLLEGE AND UNImvEmrrY LAW 413 (1972).
' Note, Judicial Review of the University-Student Relationship: Expulsion and
Governance, 26 STAN. L. Rxv. 95 (1973-74); Note, Common Law Rights for Private
University Students: Beyond the State Action Principle, 84 YAE L.J. 120 (1974-75).
11 Note, Legal Relationship Between the Student and the Private College or
University, 7 SAN DIEao L. REv. 244 (1970).
•1 Id.; Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 H Rv. L. RE V. 1406, 1407
(1957).
51 For a discussion of the Statute of Frauds' application to the private univer-
sity/student contract, see Comment, Consumer Protection and Higher Educa-
tion-Student Suits Against Schools, 37 OMo ST. L.J. 608, 616 (1976). The author
views the Statute of Frauds as posing no problem for recovery on one of these contracts.
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statement,12 but if courts would apply a strict contractual ap-
proach, decisions supporting the university would not be as
widespread.
College catalogs or publications generally include a provi-
sion reserving the right to dismiss a student for misbehavior,
lack of good character or immoral behavior.5 3 The problem
arises when a student challenges the school's determination
that his conduct has breached the contract term. Even when
these conduct provisions are ambiguous, courts have been re-
luctant to reverse a university's interpretation of its regula-
tions, in distinct contradiction to the result demanded by for-
mal contract law.
When a disciplinary provision in a college publication is
challenged for vagueness, the question ultimately becomes one
of degree.54 In ordinary situations, a standard of reasonable
expectations should be used in interpreting a contract. The
term should be construed to mean whatever the party drafting
the contract (the university) should reasonably expect the stu-
dent to think it means. 5 Also, terms should be given their
52 See notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this point.
51 Some colleges even include disclaimers or statements that no irrevocable con-
tract exists, leaving the university free to change its rules and regulations. See K.
ALEXANDER & E. SOLOMON, supra note 47, at 413. It is fair to say, however, that courts
would imply a good faith requirement not to dismiss a student or to change regulations
in an arbitrary manner. Otherwise, there would be an apparent lack of consideration,
for the university would not have bound itself to anything, and a contract, therefore,
would not exist.
51 Vagueness, indefiniteness and uncertainty are matters of degree, with
no absolute standard for comparison. It must be remembered that all modes
of human expression are defective and inadequate. Every student of lan-
guage knows this to be true of words. Every good dictionary shows that most
important words have been given several, or even many, meanings; and these
meanings themselves must be expressed in other words that are equally
difficult of definition.
1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 95 (1963).
55 Lyons v. Salve Regina College, 565 F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 971 (1978). See J. MURRAY, CONTRACTS § 111 (2d rev. ed. 1974), where it is
stated:
The practical aim of interpretation might be stated as follows: to approxi-
mate as closely as possible, consistent with proper precautionary safeguards,
the meaning of manifestations of intention which the party employing them
should reasonably anticipate they would convey to the other party, and the
party receiving them would reasonably understand them to mean.
See also 17 AM. JuR. 2d Contracts § 248 (1964); 4 WILISTON, CONTRACTS § 605 (3d ed.
1961).
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common, everyday meaning when being construed." As long as
a term has an accepted meaning and the university is interpret-
ing it reasonably, '5 there will be no justification for reversing
the university's decision.
Many terms relating to conduct, however, are so ambigu-
ous that formal rules of contract construction must be applied
11 Basch v. George Washington Univ., 370 A.2d 1364, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 17
AM. JuR. 2d Contracts § 247 (1964); J. MumAY, CoNTRAcTs §§ 116, 121 (2d rev. ed.
1974).
That words should be given their common meaning is one of the primary rules of
construction established by the American Law Institute in its Restatement of
Contracts. According to the Restatement, these primary rules should be applied when
an ambiguity arises:
(a) The ordinary meaning of language throughout the country is given to
words unless circumstances show that a different meaning is applicable.
(b) Technical terms and words of art are given their technical meaning
unless the context or a usage which is applicable indicates a different mean-
ing.
(c) A writing is interpreted as a whole and all writings forming part of the
same transaction are interpreted together.
(d) All circumstances accompanying the transaction may be taken into con-
sideration ....
(e) If the conduct of the parties subsequent to a manifestation of intention
indicates that all the parties placed a particular interpretation upon it, that
meaning is adopted if a reasonable person could attach it to the manifesta-
tion.
RESTATEMENT Op CoNTRACTs § 235 (1932).
51 For example, the university in Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898 (1975), contended that its code provision requir-
ing students to observe "high principles of honor, integrity and morality," and that
students "[b]e honest in all behavior," including "not cheating, plagiarizing or know-
ingly giving false information," precluded a student from using the name of a professor
as a coauthor on several writings. Id. at 624. The court quite properly agreed with this
interpretation. However, the Brigham Young code contained sufficiently clear and
precise conduct standards rarely seen in such provisions.
But even when standards are unclear and the university is acting reasonably, the
court will agree with the interpretation. According to 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contracts §
242(1964), "The courts will give a contract a fair and reasonable construction, and will
give effect to whatever may reasonably be implied by the language employed." Thus,
a reasonable interpretation by the university will find favor with the courts.
It should be noted, however, that Professor Corbin has rejected the "reasonable
man" approach. He would look instead to what one or both of the parties actually
meant by the words employed. 1 A. CoRaiN, CoNmACTS § 543 (ed. 1952). But when it
is the university, a party to the contract, who is adopting a reasonable interpretation,
both Corbin and the majority of courts would seem to be satisfied. The important
element is that the courts actually find that a reasonable interpretation is being sup-
plied, rather than merely relying on the university's judgment.
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to safeguard the student's interests.A" Because students often
have a limited choice regarding which school they will attend,
there is a lack of equal bargaining power. 9 Consequently, stu-
dents are faced with a "take it or leave it" contract comparable
11 See 17 AM. JuR. 2d Contracts § 241 (1964), which states that when the intentions
of the parties are doubtful, "[a]greements inartificially drafted or containing lan-
guage which is obscure, imperfect, or ambiguous are always open to interpretation. In
such a case established rules of interpretation are invoked to determine the meaning."
These rules of interpretation include the primary rules listed in note 56 supra as well
as these secondary rules promulgated by the Restatement:
(a) An interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful and effective meaning
to all manifestations of intention is preferred to an interpretation which
leaves a part of such manifestation unreasonable, unlawful or of no effect.
(b) The principal apparent purpose of the parties is given great weight in
determining the meaning to be given to manifestations of intention or to any
part thereof.
(c) Where there is an inconsistency between general provisions and specific
provisions, the specific provisions ordinarily qualify the meaning of the gen-
eral provisions.
(d) Where words or other manifestations of intention bear more than one
reasonable meaning an interpretation is preferred which operates more
strongly against the party from whom they proceed, unless their use by him
is proscribed by law.
(e) Where written provisions are inconsistent with the printed provisions, an
interpretation is preferred which gives effect to the written provisions.
(f) Where a public interest is affected an interpretation is preferred which
favors the public.
RESTATEMrNT oF CoNRAcTs § 236 (1932).
The Restatement advocates resort to these secondary rules only when the primary
rules have not resolved the ambiguity. It can be said with relative certainty, however,
that when conduct terms are involved which have more than one reasonable meaning,
these secondary rules should almost always be necessarily employed. Unfortunately,
courts seldom do so in the university/student contract context.
Courts are likewise reluctant to hold that these conduct terms are void as vague,
even when rules of interpretation cannot resolve the ambiguity. In Carr v. St. John's
Univ., 231 N.Y.S.2d 403, 409 (1962), the trial court said terms in the college bulletin
pertaining to "Christian education and conduct" were impermissibly vague. The court
said:
The rule of reasonableness however requires that the regulations in ques-
tion be subjected to the test whether or not they are certain as to their
meaning. If they are ambiguous and uncertain they must be condemned.
They should be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to them
what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.
Id. While this decision was a good example of applying strict contract law to a univer-
sity/student contract, it unfortunately was reversed, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, aff'd mem., 187
N.E.2d 18 (1962).
11 But see Note, Legal Relationship Between the Student and the Private College
or University, 7 SAN DIEGO L. Rnv., 244, 264 (1970).
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to a contract of adhesion. 60 In adhesion contracts, ambiguities
are resolved against the more powerful party." Furthermore,
the well-established maxim of contra proferentem dictates that
a term is to be strictly construed against the draftsman." By
application of these principles a university's interpretation of
the ambiguous term would be carefully scrutinized and any
doubt resolved in favor of the student.
3
Additionally, courts could find that there was no agree-
ment on the contract term in question and then imply a reason-
able term." In so doing, courts could point to the lack of a
1 Id. Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HA{v. L. Rlv. 1045, 1147
(1968). An adhesion contract is defined as "one which is dictated by a predominant
party to cover transactions with many people rather than with an individual, and
which resembles an ultimatum or law rather than a mutually negotiated contract." J.
CALAir & J. PERRILLO, THE LAW OF CoNT crs, 341 n.39 (2d ed. 1977).
11 See Galligan v. Arovitch, 219 A.2d 463 (Pa. 1966); North Gate Corp. v. Nat'l
Food Stores, 140 N.W.2d 744 (Wis. 1966).
12 Basch v. George Washington Univ., 370 A.2d 1364, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Har-
ris, J., concurring). See Comment, supra note 18, at 265.
This term is a fundamental principle of contract law. According to 17 AM. Jun.
2d Contracts § 276 (1964):
It is fundamental that doubtful language in a contract should be interpreted
most strongly against the party who selected that language, especially where
he seeks to use such language to defeat the contract or its operation ...
Also, in case of doubt or ambiguity a contract will be construed most strongly
against the party who drew or prepared it, or whose attorney drew or pre-
pared it.
Id. This prinicple should be applied when ordinary (primary) rules of construction
have not resolved the ambiguity. See note 56 supra for a review of these rules.
See also 1 A. CoRmIN, CoNTAcrs § 559 (ed. 1952); J. MupRAy, CoNTRACTs § 119
(2d rev. ed. 1974).
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts has even placed this rule of construction
in a separate section, apart from other secondary rules. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoMN) OF
CoNTRAcrs § 232 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7 1973).
1 "[A] contract provision which does not clearly express the intention of the
parties should be construed against the one for whose benefit it was inserted." 17 Am.
Jun. 2d Contracts § 275 (1964).
Additionally, due to the student's lack of bargaining power, a court could find
vague disciplinary rules unconscionable regulations of student conduct and thereby
regard them as not binding on the student. And the "in terrorem" effect of vague rules
is an indication of their unconscionability. See Developments in the Law-Academic
Freedom, 81 HAnv. L. REv. 1045, 1147 (1968); Comment, Consumer Protection &
Higher Education-Student Suits Against Schools, 37 OmO ST. L.J. 608, 616 (1976).
11 By so doing, courts could follow an approach similar to that found in the Uni-
form Commercial Code. See U.C.C. § 2-204(3), 2-305--2-309 (1972 version). Al-
though these contracts do not involve a sale of goods, the U.C.C. method for resolving
vagueness problems makes sense in this context.
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formal, integrated contract 5 and thus take cognizance of cus-
tom and usage in defining the contract provisions. 6 Also, origi-
nal vagueness could be alleviated if the conduct of the parties
after the formation of the contract shed light on the meaning
intended by the agreement.67 As another alternative, courts
could refuse to imply a reasonable term and hold that there is
no contractual obligation arising from overly broad contract
terms." Finally, the burden of proof should be placed on the
university, since it is the party attempting to show that the
contract has been breached by the student's misconduct."0
This strict contractual approach would protect student
interests without unduly prejudicing the rights of the univer-
sity. Schools would merely be required to protect themselves
by spelling out in clear language exactly what sort of conduct
is prohibited. 0 Indubitably, this type of explicit drafting would
more adequately safeguard student rights.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 230 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7 1973).
65 Lyons v. Salve Regina College, 565 F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 971 (1978).
" Peretti v. State of Mont., 464 F. Supp. 784 (D. Mont. 1979). See 17 k. JuR.
2d Contracts § 77 (1964).
j. MURRAY, CoNmACr § 118 (2d rev. ed. 1974); 1 A. Commn, CoNmACrs § 558
(ed. 1952); LdiCKE, Illusory, Vague & Uncertain Contractual Terms, 6 ADEL. L. REv. 1,
10 (1977).
88 This rule was applied in favor of the university in Basch v. George Washington
Univ., 370 A.2d 1364, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1977), where the school's projection of tuition
increases was found to be too broad to create a binding contractual obligation. Accord,
Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir.), reh. denied, 531 F.2d 575 (1976).
This rule is stated generally in 17 AM. JuR. 2d Contracts § 75 (1964), which says,
"It has been held that, under some circumstances, where only one provision of a
contract is before the court for determination and it is so vague and uncertain as to be
unenforceable, it may be left unperformed and the remainder of the contract left
subject to performance."
e Comment, note 18 supra, at 267 n.68.
78 Application of these general contract principles should not bind stu-
dents to any terms unless the catalogue provisions are presented in such a
way that the student can reasonably be expected to read them and under-
stand them to be part of a binding contract with the university. If the univer-
sity desires to enforce any rule or waiver clause against the student, it should




V. THE VANCE CASE
The inequitable result that can occur when a strict con-
tractual approach is not followed is aptly demonstrated in a
recent Kentucky case, Lexington Theological Seminary v.
Vance.7' After completing all required course work, Ottie David
Vance was denied a degree from the Lexington Theological
Seminary because he was a homosexual. The Seminary con-
tended that Vance's homosexuality breached the contract's
requirements of "fundamental character" consistent with sem-
inary principles.
2
Vance had enrolled in the Seminary in 1972 and in 1974
applied for degree candidacy. In 1975, Vance told both a dean
at the Seminary and the Seminary president that he was a
homosexual. The president advised Vance that his homosex-
7, Nos. 78-CA-1169-MR & 78-CA-1172-MR. (Ky. Ct. App. May 18, 1979), discre-
tionary rev. granted, 589 S.W.2d 897 (Ky., Nov. 13, 1979). Lexington Theological
Seminary had appealed a judgment ordering it to grant Vance a Master of Divinity
graduate degree. Vance cross-appealed on the issue of damages. Although constitu-
tional issues were raised by the Seminary at both the trial and appellate court levels,
both courts refused to consider the constitutional arguments and decided the case
purely on a contractual basis. Any constitutional issues raised by the Vance case are
clearly beyond the scope of this comment.
71 The Seminary bulletin for the admission years of 1972-73 contained these provi-
sions:
Lexington Theological Seminary is engaged at the graduate level in profes-
sional education for the Christian ministry. Finding its charter in the gospel
transmitted through the Bible and born through history by the ongoing life
of the church, it seeks to equip its graduates to serve as contemporary ser-
vants of that gospel.
By the time of graduation, students are expected, having worked through
problems of vocational indecision, to be firmly committed to the role and
mission with which they will begin their ministry. At the time of his applica-
tion for candidacy, the student's overall seminary profile, including perfor-
mance, field education leadership, financial responsibility, and fundamental
character, is evaluated by the faculty. No student on probation may be
admitted to candidacy.
Standards and policies: Lexington Theological Seminary will consider
for admission applicants who hold a BA Degree or its equivalent. Preference
will be given to graduates of accredited institutions who have concentrated
in the Liberal Arts, maintained a minimum of B average in their presemi-
nary studies, and display traits of character and personality which indicate
probable effectiveness in the Christian ministry.
Brief for Appellant at 7, Lexington Theological Seminary Inc. v. Vance, Nos. 78-CA-
1169-MR, & 78-CA-1172-MR (Ky. Ct. App. May 18, 1979), discretionary rev. granted,
589 S.W.2d 897 (Ky., Nov. 13, 1979).
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uality could jeopardize his chances of receiving a degree. How-
ever, in January of 1976, Vance received a letter stating that
his degree application was being deferred until one course was
completed. Vance completed the course and in May of 1976 the
faculty recommended that Vance receive his Master of Divinity
degree. Neither the school's Executive Committee nor its full
Board of Trustees would approve this recommendation and the
degree was therefore denied.
73
Vance sued the school, and the trial court ordered the
Seminary to confer the degree, saying that the catalog did not
set forth reasonably clear standards. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals reversed, taking the position that the standards con-
cerning character were sufficiently clear and easily understand-
able by "anyone who possesses the intelligence to gain admis-
sion to an accredited institution of higher learning.''15
A rigid application of contractual doctrine would yield a
different result in the Vance case. Undoubtedly, such terms as
"servants of the gospel," "firmly committed to the role and
mission with which they will begin their ministry,"
"fundamental character" and "display traits of character and
personality which indicate probable effectiveness in the Chris-
tian ministry"76 are ambiguous." Because the catalog provi-
,s Id. at 3-5.
V' vance v. Lex. Theological Seminary, et. al., Dkt. No. 76-2773 (Fayette Cir. Ct.
June 30, 1978). The court stated:
These phrases [see note 72 supra for the catalog provisions] might be
clear to the members of Disciples of Christ and to the Board of Trustees, but
they do not seem to be that clear to this court. If the defendant wants to deny
admission or a degree to students then it should state clearly in its catalog
that it will not admit or confer degrees for certain stated reasons.
Id.
75 Lex. Theological Seminary, Inc. v. Vance, Nos. 78-CA-1169-MR & 78-CA-1172-
MR (Ky. Ct. App. May 18, 1979), discretionary rev. granted, 589 S.W.2d 897 (Ky.,
Nov. 13, 1979). The court of appeals seemed to view this requirement of "Christian
character" as an academic requirement, rather than a disciplinary standard. The court
said, "The courts will not generally interfere in the operations of colleges and universi-
ties, especially in actions challenging the institution's academic regulations, since the
courts possess minimum expertise in this area." Id. at 8.
Possessing Christian character could quite plausibly be deemed more a regulation
of conduct than an academic requirement. If so, then this dismissal for "misconduct"
should have been more carefully scrutinized. See notes 20-24 supra aid accompanying
text for a discussion of the need for closer scrutiny of dismissals for misconduct.
76 See note 72 supra for the relevant catalog provisions.
Certainly their meaning was not so clear as to definitely exclude homosexuals
[Vol. 68
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sions were vague, the court should have applied strict princi-
ples of contractual interpretation ' s and resolved the ambiguity
in the adhesion contract in favor of the student-the non-
drafting party.79 Furthermore if the actions of the parties are
seen as illuminating the meaning of the terms,80 the school's
acceptance of Vance for another semester after his homosexual-
ity had been revealed would necessitate a determination that
homosexuality was not inconsistent with the contract provi-
sions. Also, if broadly drafted terms are not to create specific
contractual obligations,8 ' then Vance would not be required to
comply with those vague provisions in order to graduate.
Even if the various terms mentioned above were not
viewed as ambiguous, application of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel should have prevented the Seminary from withhold-
ing Vance's degree.8" After school officials were aware of
Vance's homosexuality, they recommended he take another
course and accepted additional tuition. Such action would pre-
sumably supersede the tentative warning of possible dismissal
that the Seminary's president had issued. Estoppel principles
thus would preclude subsequent denial of the degree.
CONCLUSION
The Vance decision is a clear example of the need for strict
application of contract law to the student/private university
relationship. Forcing schools to clearly define their terms would
not result in an intolerable burden on the university and would
put students on notice as to the precise standards with which
or the faculty would not have recommended that Vance graduate. Even the Seminary
president was not certain that Vance's homosexuality would mandate his dismissal.
Lex. Theological Seminary, Inc. v. Vance, Nos. 78-CA-1169-MR & 78-CA-1172-MR
(Ky. Ct. App. May 18, 1979), discretionary rev. granted, 589 S.W.2d 897 (Ky., Nov.
13, 1979).
s See notes 58-70 supra and accompanying text for discussion of these principles.
7 See notes 60-61 supra and accompanying text for a short discussion of adhesion
contracts.
See note 67 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this point.
s See note 63 supra for a review of cases that have applied this principle in favor
of universities. Seemingly, if universities will not be bound to generally stated terms,
then students should be accorded the same treatment.
82 See Lexington Theological Seminary, Inc. v. Vance, Nos. 78-CA-1169-MR & 78-
CA-1172-MR (Ky. Ct. App. May 18, 1979), discretionary rev. granted, 589 S.W.2d 897
(Ky., Nov. 13, 1979) (Howerton, J., dissenting). Howerton's dissent was based pri-
marily on the estoppel issue.
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compliance would be required. Additionally, courts whose duty
it is to interpret the contract would be better equipped to ac-
complish their task. The greater the degree of specificity, the
less chance for either party to be placed in a disadvantageous
position.
Clear definition of terms will not occur, however, unless
the courts take a firm approach to interpreting these contracts.
As long as schools are free to vaguely define conduct require-
ments and to later interpret those requirements when a dispute
arises, the threat of potential injustice will accompany each
student's entrance into an implied university contract.
Rebecca White
